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Abstract 
 
The primary motive to this research is the specific form of soft power the EU use in its policy, especially the 
enlargement policy. Thus, over comprehensive analyze of its policy, researching the previous experiences in this 
field, the ongoing process with the candidate members, and using the method of case study with the Republic of 
Macedonia in particular, we can see closer how the soft power works in this part of its policy and in which forms it 
is expressed. According to the research and the results, we could see the differences between the other power of the 
EU used in its policy, and the specific form of soft power used in the Enlargement policy. This type of power is 
collocated of various elements such as Copenhagen criteria, progress reports and for the very first in the case with 
the Republic of Macedonia is launched the High Level Accession Dialogue. Despite the complicated process and 
endless framework followed by the slow development in the state policy, the survey results with positive public 
opinion on the sole enlargement process and the EU membership. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper will be analyzed the process of the EU enlargement policy toward the 
Republic of Macedonia, from the soft power aspect and its instruments. The EU enlargement 
policy is based on specific criteria and that is: 
• complying with all the EU's standards and rules 
• having the consent of the EU institutions and  
• EU member states having the consent of their citizens – as expressed through approval in 
their national parliament or by referendum (European Commission, 2014).  
 
According to this order the process of the enlargement is implemented. At first, the state 
is asked for achieving of the Copenhagen criteria and the negotiations follow it. For all of the 
time, the process is being monitored by the European Commission that submits statements to the 
European Parliament and the European Council. What is in our interest here is not the process in 
its entirety but those parts only where the European Union enforces its power in the process. 
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THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SOFT POWER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE 
CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
 
From all of the candidate states of the European Union, the Republic of Macedonia has 
the longest chronology in the relations with the EU. Stabilization and Association Agreement 
(further in the text as: SAA) was signed in April, 2001 and it is coming into force right after 
three years in 2004. When the SAA come into force, the Republic of Macedonia faced with the 
acceptance of the Copenhagen criteria. They are not clearly stated and noted in the agreement, 
but at the very beginning that presents a formal introduction to the Agreement, is written: 
Recalling the European Union's readiness to integrate to the fullest possible extent the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into the political and economic mainstream of 
Europe and its status as a potential candidate for EU membership on the basis of the 
Treaty on European Union and fulfillment of the criteria defined by the European Council 
in June 1993 (bold added by us), subject to successful implementation of this Agreement, 
notably regarding regional cooperation (…) (SAA, 2001).  
 
It means that since 2001 respectively 2004, Macedonia faces the Copenhagen criteria and 
with the signing of the SAA formally accept them. There is not any coercion or sanction in the 
case with Macedonia if the conditions would not be fulfilled, but the only sanction is the fact that 
without its fulfillment the state could not become a member. Though, the Agreement does not 
show up accidentally. As the European Commission listed on its website, the Republic of 
Macedonia and the European Union established international communication through diplomatic 
represents, Co-operation Agreement, Agreement on the Trade in Textile Products, Agreement in 
the field of the transport. On that way, the EU step by step is turning the political organizing of 
the state, especially when it comes for a state such the Republic of Macedonia is, when in that 
period is placed in an early phase of transition of the economic and the political system. Stating 
such a framework for co-operation gives a new dimension to the foreign policy of the state 
themselves. The guide of working stated as that, which trough the state detect the benefit of it, 
actually is the guide in whom the European Union gradually put itself as a friend and an “ally” in 
the struggle with the former and the gateway to the new system of organizing of the state. Since 
the European Union has put itself in that way toward Macedonia opens area in where the soft 
power over attraction and co-opt succeed to model the behaviour of the state. It goes easy in that 
way because is in phase where the friends of that kind (such the European Union) are necessary 
as a significant help for its progress.  
The agreements are just one way to obtain legitimacy to the power that the European 
Union execute toward the Republic of Macedonia. The benefit is mutual because the aim of the 
European Union is a successful enlargement policy toward as much as more states, with an 
intention for spreading its influence on all of the Continent of Europe, while, for the Republic of 
Macedonia that means a free and open market, faster progress and removing of the barriers with 
which is faced with, but the security and stability too. If we look into the chronology of the 
relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the European Union, we can note a constantly 
presence of the European Union with its programmes and activities. Starting from 1996 when the 
Republic of Macedonia becomes eligible for funding under the EC’s PHARE programme, than 
the trade agreements, the Stabilisation and Association Process, the EU’s special representatives, 
the application for membership, the candidate status, the visa facilitation agreement, the High 
Level Accession Dialogue etc. is a period of about twenty years cooperation and conjugation to 
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the European Union. It that way, it is not formed the foreign policy of the state only but the 
public opinion too. Because of the fact that within the recent years, every government works on 
the relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the EU, a picture for the significance of 
that relations is formed a front of the public opinion. That is one of the ways how the European 
Union is building its European Perspective to this states, working on the perception of the 
citizens for the necessity of the membership.  
 
The Copenhagen criteria 
 
The fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria in the process with the Republic of Macedonia, 
as a state with the candidate status is monitored over the evaluation and objections noted in the 
Progress Reports by the European Commission submitted to the state. The problem we found is 
that the Reports are vaguely and the evaluation itself is still an open question because: 
• There are not clearly presented parameters according by the fulfilment of the 
conditions is evaluated (i.e. in the Progress Report from 2014 is noted: Progress is 
measured on the basis of decisions taken, legislation adopted and measures 
implemented. As a rule, legislation or measures which are under preparation or 
awaiting parliamentary approval have not been taken into account.) 
• The fact that there is no exist an objective criterion for evaluation, enable 
subjectivity in the evaluation by the people that evaluates (i.e. in the Progress Report 
from 2014 is noted: This approach [the approach mentioned above in this 
paragraph] ensures equal treatment across all reports and enables an objective 
assessment). 
 
In all of the Reports are noted the areas where the state has made a progress in the 
fulfillment of the criteria but as a more important – what should be done further. We can say that 
this process is weak because it allows to the process to last many years, and that is on account of 
the objections and its declarative dimension i.e. it does not cause any consequences if the state 
does not fulfill the parts that are noted as unfulfilled and where the state should dedicate more 
attention. Over the stand criteria the EU focus the policy, economy and the legal system of one 
country toward a unified globally accepted (as normal) a way of behaving. Actually in this case 
the EU achieves all of this using attraction and co-opt. The criteria are expression of a value-
normative framework of the EU that has been offered to the states. That value-normative pattern, 
with well-founded reasons the states accept it and decide to implement it to the political systems. 
The difference here is in the expressed intention of the European Union in order to exercise its 
soft power. Thus, the negative aspect in this case is founded in the vagueness of the stated 
criteria and the possibility for a subjective element in the evaluation, not giving the clear picture 
for successfulness/unsuccessfulness of the implemented politics i.e. the criteria. In that manner 
we are going to do short analyses to the Progress Report (to the political criteria, in particular) of 
Macedonia, after the parliamentary elections in 2011 that is the Reports of 2012, 2013 and 2014. 
 
The soft power and the public opinion 
 
Besides the intentional (indirect) influence over creating of the public opinion throughout 
the official documents and the other programs of the European Union spreading the influence 
over the candidate states such as the Republic of Macedonia, it succeeded to give deceivableness 
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to the process itself including not just an abstract picture about the European perspective but a 
direct involvement of the citizens in the process too. One of the programs is ERAZMUS+, where 
in the official introduction to the program is noted: 
The Erasmus+ programme aims to boost skills and employability, as well as modernizing 
Education, Training, and Youth work. The seven year programme will have a budget of 
€14.7 billion; a 40% increase compared to current spending levels, reflecting the EU’s 
commitment to investing in these areas. Erasmus+ will provide opportunities for over 4 
million Europeans to study, train, gain work experience and volunteer abroad (Erasmus, 
2014).  
 
As a conclusion we will draw out two elements that are imposed by this programme: 
attraction and financial aid. In this way it shapes the public opinion throughout the programme, 
perceiving the European Perspective: 
• An opportunity for upgrade: the students and the youth are awarded with an 
opportunity to study in the EU countries and have a chance to meet the culture, 
language and tradition. 
• A feeling for belongingness: calling them Europeans, it creates them a feeling for 
belongingness of the youth to the culture and values of the Europe (the European 
Union, in particular); 
• Existence and experience: seven years, the NGOs, universities, research centers 
etc. have a chance to work on EU projects where the youth will have an 
opportunity to be employed or to volunteer on those projects while the rest of the 
population will be informed through the media about these projects. 
 
According to it, the European Union encloses its pattern of work closer to the citizens 
more than the official international legal acts. The citizens are directly involved in this process, 
aware of the benefits of these programs. It gives a positive impression that leads to a favorably 
public opinion on the EU. What is different of the Nay’s definition is that the inducement (where 
he classify it among the elements of the hard power), is not expressed over bribes or payments. 
Those, here we can note inducement throughout facilitation of means for existence and building 
experience in that volume where they can work on a projects acceptable to the EU. Under 
“acceptable to the EU” is open another segment of the power - directing activities. To be 
financed one project it should be in the areas that the European Union considers as a priority and 
significant. In this case we consider the two-dimensional aspect to the power that is about crating 
the agenda, where from the soft power aspect it means “A uses attraction and institutions to 
impose on B to take the agenda as legitimate”. Here we have creating a framework in which will 
be covered those areas where the EU decided about as important to be set on “the agenda” and 
the institutions that have projects funded by the EU, must behave according to. Because of these 
reasons we could not say that the EU makes payments to achieve its goals over bribes and 
payments and that is why this financial type of help we could not classified under that category 
as an element of the hard power. We could look at these relations as a relation compatible to the 
employer and employee, where the EU funds projects that considers as a priority to its 
development, but on the other hand the states accept it aims emolument and co-operation with 
the EU and aware or unaware acceptance to the EU’s framework of values and culture. 
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Adaptation to the soft power through the EU’s Progress reports 
 
With the Progress reports of the European Commission is expressed the progress or 
regress of the Republic of Macedonia, related to the fulfillment of the criteria required for 
membership in the EU. These reports make retrospective to the recent year and the areas where 
the state made progress as well as where the situation became worse than before. It says where 
should improve too. Significant to be noted is that the Reports set the guidelines the state should 
follow during creation of its policy.  
From the aspect of the soft power it means the giving guidelines and the support by the 
European Union as well over the reports, without sanction to any undesirable (for the EU) 
behavior by the state (the Republic of Macedonia) is the way of shaping behavior of the state. 
The state voluntarily accept the supervision by the European Union considered as wishful for 
implementation of its aim – development of the state and membership in the EU. Because the 
reports mostly have descriptive character, the fulfillment of the criteria depends on the “good 
will” of the state without any timeframes or deadlines where the state would have been 
determined to achieve it. In the reports as a guidelines and explanations are mostly used the 
phrases: “the National Council for EU Integration (NCEI) should play a greater role in 
assembling a broad national consensus on European integration […] Continued efforts are 
needed (bold added) to develop the capacity of the parliament and political dialogue needs to be 
strengthened” (Progress Report, 2012). From this point of view we see the “non obligatory” 
nature of the Report, on the other hand according to the title (“report”) says that it has more 
informative character rather than obligatory document. The terms such as “should play a greater 
role” and “continued efforts are needed” produce only directions for the state to be followed. On 
that way the soft power is exercised over the reports. The state builds its policy according to the 
directions given by the European Union; shaping its behavior in a way desired by the EU and all 
of that on a voluntary base, with aim creating a developed system that would mean a readiness 
for membership in the European Union. That could be note as a definition for the soft power 
exercised over the reports in this way. If the positive aspect of the soft power means intention for 
advancement and progress of the political, economic and legal system in the state and later, 
accession to the EU, we have another aspect through we can look at the this situation. As we said 
above, the reports means announcement on the situation but most often that announcement on 
the situation is not appropriate to the real condition of the state. The problem is that the 
evaluation has been made basically according to the fact – how many changes has been made in 
the legislation in particular area, where the European Union pointed on the needed changes, but 
not on how that changes the reality: 
[the] parliament adopted 10 new laws and revised over 80 others, including some relating 
to acquis reforms, raising concerns about the inclusivity of the process […] There have 
been no amendments to the Constitution since 2011, and it is broadly in line with 
European standards (Progress report, 2013).  
 
There is only difference in the latest Report (2014) where has been sent a more rigorous 
critic that is different from the usual way for evaluation of the situation so far. In the part 
addressed to the Judiciary and fundamental rights, is said: 
One of the main challenges is the growing concern voiced about the selectivity of, and 
influence over, law enforcement and the judiciary. The basic rule of law principle, that 
justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done, is not fully understood or 
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respected by the authorities in terms of law enforcement actions targeted at specific 
persons or sectors (Progress report, 2014).  
 
Besides the enhanced “rigorous critic”, the non obligatory effect of the Report itself, stays 
unchanged and there are no any further fines in that manner. Again it leads us to the mechanism 
of the soft power. If we try to drawn a conclusion by this cite than it will be dedicated to the soft 
power of the European Union and the problem in it, because even the noted suggestions in the 
reports (speaking for the Republic of Macedonia, in particular), the same problems even spread, 
remains. If the EU’s work till today was to maintain the directions to the state about how to 
achieve the results needed for accession, with special emphasis that despite the de iure are 
important the de facto results as well – “that justice must not only be done but must also be seen 
to be done. The European Union, usually, recognize that in an area are enforced around ten new 
laws and that could result with a positive statement by the EC: the state makes an effort. That 
means, in this part the problems are solving and with implementation of the laws – the problems 
would be completely solved. But if after a few years in one of the next reports would be note the 
same problem again, that was previously been considered as solved, there must be a problem the 
relation between the executor of the power (EU) on one side and the subject on the other side 
(Republic of Macedonia). Because of this “reaction” of the state on the “action” by the EU – 
over the exercising of the soft power of the enlargement policy, could be located the further 
problems: 
• The state has a political interest (that is different of their citizens) to delay the 
process of accession; 
• A deficit on legal and political instruments during the implementation of the soft 
power by the European Union. 
 
About the first problem, it could be diverse. As a candidate country, the state enjoy 
specific privileges and help of the European Union but the state sovereignty is still not shared 
with the EU, and it means more freedom in enforcing its “own” politics without any special 
control from the EU about it. On that way, the state can practice “double policy” – the one with 
the EU where it can be shown the picture about the reforms and its enforcement and the efforts 
for accession. On the other hand, a front of the citizens is showed another picture where they just 
see that we work but the EU is not enough satisfied and does not appreciate our effort. While, in 
the other hand a front of the population is presented that the EU does not like the Republic 
Macedonia as its member. The name issue between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece along 
with the unanimity of the EU, just confirm that situation where the Republic of Macedonia is a 
“martyr” with clear will for accession otherwise the will of the EU is very vague. Unfortunately 
the “formal” policy that state relate with the EU produces just “formal” results i.e. summum ius - 
summa iniuria. On the other hand, the second problem is in the lack of political instruments, the 
EU is trying to maintain through the new process called as High Level Accession Dialogue – 
HLAD. As the commissioner S. Fule says: “We are now in a second, more challenging phase 
where we need to focus on concrete measures and indicators of progress. Much work will need 
to be done between now and our next meeting”, it means work practiced up to now need more 
engagement, enhanced intensity and concreteness.   
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The High Level Accession Dialogue 
 
The High Level Accession Dialogue (HLAD) for a first time is launched to case with the 
Republic of Macedonia. Because of the lasting long candidate status of the country, the EU aims 
to continue the further co-operation besides the absence of negotiations. The aim of the HLAD is 
addressing the key areas that are problems for the state: 
• Freedom of expression and professional standards; 
• Rule of law; 
• Public administration reforms; 
• Electoral reforms; 
• Strengthening the market economy. 
 
The HLAD has been established in 2012 and was expected to be a new phase in the 
enlargement process of the European Union toward the Republic of Macedonia. In its 
Enlargement strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, the Commission in the relation to the 
enlargement process and the new Dialog stressed: “the HLAD has contributed to progress in 
most priority areas. The progress being made under HLAD will stand the country in good stead 
when negotiations begin. However it is not, and cannot be, a substitute for moving to the opening 
of accession negotiations”. (ESMC, 2013) Although have been given a lot of significance to the 
HLAD, it was not applied in the reality as it was seen at the beginning. There are no new 
moments with its launching but only a few segments of the process are drawn. As it has been 
stressed into the Enlargement strategy, the Dialog has more political than legal significance and 
thus, it is more instrument of the soft power than a legal act of help to the enlargement policy. 
The Dialog refers to a period when the state faces the problems and veto by its neighbor on the 
euro-integration way and the European Union understand the need of the changes aims to proof 
its intention for accepting the state as a member. The Dialog along with the Roadmap (it is the 
government obligation and is made by), are two implemented over two mechanisms: strategy and 
operative (technical) mechanism. The strategy mechanism is compound by the priority tasks of 
the pre-accession process, drawn as main areas of the Dialog. While, in the operative or the 
technical mechanisms are the instruments and the institutions to the activities the government 
planed according to the Dialog. In this way, the government prepares the Roadmap for the 
implementation of the Priority activities of the High Level Accession Dialogue where the further 
plans are set i.e. the aims that should be achieved presented in the HLAD. 
If we take the Progress report 2014 as an indicator on the progress of the state and we see 
the segments that are drawn of it and set as a main areas in the HLAD, the expected progress is 
not just unachieved but the that areas in particular became worst than before and being 
additionally criticized by the Commission. That means the HLAD does not bring any changes in 
better way to the European integration. The HLAD is just an instrument for attraction and point 
to the presence of the EU in the state policy potentiates to significance of the integration itself 
through establishing a new mechanism although they do not make any elementary move in a 
positive way of the process. If we thought on the fact that the EU enlargement policy is founded 
to the soft power principles, than we could put the HLAD in that category, judging by the 
intention of the European Union. 
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The civil society and the public opinion 
 
Next method not only of creating a policy of the state but a method of directing of the 
civil society activities (and the public opinion) is over the projects funded by the EU mentioned 
in the programs above. Funding the projects should not be seen as bribe to the state but it can be 
seen as an obvious and legitimate mutual benefit (between the EU and the Republic of 
Macedonia) for both of the sides. We potentiate “an obvious and legitimate mutual benefit” to 
draw a clear line between the payment and bribe that Joseph Nye said on the hard power and the 
soft power elements we talk about in this case. Noting the importance of the civil society and the 
public opinion as well, in the Commission communication from 2012 is stated: 
An empowered civil society is a crucial component of any democratic system and is an 
asset in itself. It represents and fosters pluralism and can contribute to more effective 
policies, equitable and sustainable development and inclusive growth. It is an important 
player in fostering peace and in conflict resolution. (…) CSOs therefore contribute to 
building more accountable and legitimate states, leading to enhanced social cohesion and 
more open and deeper democracies (Commission Communication, 2012).  
 
That benefit for the state is in the funding of the projects of the civil society, and the EU 
is bring its benefit according its priorities and if the project is not according the needs of the EU 
toward evaluation it will be denied. In the Progress report 2013 are set the follow areas 
(…) dialogue and cooperation between government and civil society needs to improve in 
practice, notably with those organizations dealing with social reform, gender equality, 
Roma, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) rights. The 
government needs to show greater openness to involving civil society.  
 
On that way the EU is modeling the behavior of the state institutions but the civic sector 
too, appeals on their mutual co-operation, setting patterns and areas of acting. Mostly there are 
areas of significant meaning as value pillars of the EU policy, but they are not so much promoted 
in these parts of Europe. On this way the EU make a promotion of them aims acceptance by the 
subject/state. The soft power could use the public opinion in two ways: indirect way, where the 
public opinion is used as a tool for achieving particular political goal, and direct where the public 
opinion is an aim itself. At the first, the indirect way means “communication to the public of the 
other states in manner of influencing the opinion of the other states over the indirect model” 
(Nye, 2012). In this case the public opinion is a tool which modified the public opinion in matter 
to impact the behavior of the government. At the second, the direct way means modeling to the 
public opinion not to impact the opinion of the government but for other goals. It could be trade, 
new values, new way of living etc. The European Union in the relation to the Republic of 
Macedonia practices the both of the models. Through the direct model the public opinion the EU 
make an area for acceptance of the EU’s values, the way of working, through informal model of 
education, a lot of programs and present of the standard and the lifestyle of the EU. So, the EU 
attracts the public, creating a base for further political changes. If the population would be “pro-
European” oriented the further political changes would be welcome and accepted. Otherwise, if 
the government would act in an unacceptable way for the public, the public opinion is a main 
reviewer to the policy, forming the government behavior according to the accepted worldview. 
Although the process last with years the public is directly involved in the whole process of the 
case of the Republic of Macedonia, the EU obviously pays a lot of attention toward the public 
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i.e. public opinion, using it as a tool and as a goal, also. According to the survey made by the 
Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” supported by Konrad Adenauer Foundation, shows 
the Macedonian public opinion is in dire
process and the uncertainty of the membership. 
  
Figure 1: If a referendum is held next week on Macedonia’s entrance in EU, how will you 
Support for the European integration of Macedonia is high. 
respondents (80%) said that if there is a referendum for Macedonia‘s entry in the EU, they 
will vote in favor, while a small minority of 14% will be against (IDSCS, 2014).
 
The survey shows the successfulness of the European Union in aspect of modeling with 
the public opinion in a way desired by the EU. That should means the direct factor of the public 
opinion is the EU only not the government of the Republic of Macedonia. Th
the answer of the question, that concerning the fulfillment of the criteria and the progress of the 
state. 
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 Figure 2: Do you think that Macedonia is ready for EU membership? (Source: 
 
Half of the population thinks that Macedonia is ready for EU membership. 
think that Macedonia is ready for EU membership, while 42% think it is not. 
divided in their evaluation of the progress in the EU integration proces
Almost half of the respondents (47%) have an opinion that Macedonia advanced in the 
process, while 20% think that the advancements are small. Almost one third (31%) of the 
respondents consider that progress is lacking or there was a r
 
If we sum that 47 % of the responders think that the state have advanced versus the sum 
of the responders that think the progress is small (20%) i.e. it stagnates and regresses, than we 
get 51 % of the responders think the Republic o
the responders believe the membership is necessary, though. Thus despite the negative opinion 
on the advance of the Republic of Macedonia in relation to the EU membership, the result is 
positive. It additionally confirms the result where “almost every second respondent (48%) says 
the Report will be the same as last year, while 28% think that it will show progress…” that 
means the Progress reports not always match to the reality and the perception of the publi
public opinion on accession of the state in the EU is not a result of the state reforms in the 
political system by the government, but as a result of the value 
other elements the EU uses in forming of the public opinion.
(according to the responders) is a result on the intention of implementation the EU soft power.
 
2014) 
Fifty one percent 
s over the last year. 
egress (IDSCS, 2014).
f Macedonia is not ready for the EU, but 80 % of 
– cultural framework and the 
 That attitude toward public opinion 
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CONCLUSION 
 
From the case study with the Republic of Macedonia, can be noted that the fulfillment of 
the Copenhagen criteria is not always in proportion to the Progress reports, partially it is because 
of the inability to be followed its fulfillment because of its generality, and partially because of 
the ability for manipulation with the facts by the government. Any additional news is not 
introduced with the High Level Accession Dialogue nor anything is changed in favor of the 
enlargement process, but the attention and the hope for membership in the EU are kept. From the 
survey used to measure the public opinion and the attitude toward the EU, additionally confirms 
the previously exposed conclusions by the research, the Progress reports and the measures 
accepted by the government, for the enlargement process. 
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